	'C	<b>1</b> C	
<b>L</b> .	7		

Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270

# The Changing Geopolitics of Energy – Part II

Global Oil and Gas Production and Reserves

Anthony H. Cordesman With the Assistance of Sarin Hacatoryan

Strategic Energy Initiative Center for Strategic and International Studies

August 11, 1998

# **Table of Contents**

IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS ON PRESENT AND FUTURE GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND	4
KEY OIL ISSUES	5
Estimated Growth of Oil and Gas Use: 1970-2020.	
Growing World and US Dependence on Imported Oil: 1990-2020	
In the Past, the West Has Driven the Rise in Demand for Oil with Little Impact from Developing Asia: W	
Oil Consumption: 1960-1996.	
Asia, However, has Become a Major Oil Consumer:	
Asian Oil Consumption: 1960-1996	
Asia Will Drive Most of the Future Increase in Demand for Oil: Total World Oil Consumption by Region	
1990-2020	
Comparative Growth in Demand for Oil by Region: 1990-2020	
Middle Eastern Trade with Asia Must Change Fundamentally and Recycling "Petro-Yen" Will Not Be E	
Key Gas Issues	
North America, the FSU, and Western Europe Will Stay the Largest Consumers, but Asia Will Drive Mos	
the Increase in Gas Demand	
Comparative Growth in Demand for Gas by Region: 1990-2020	
Asia Will Make Major Increases in its Gas Imports:	
Asian Gas Consumption: 1990-2020	16
·	
GEOPOLITICAL IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS RESERVES	17
OIL RESERVES AND GEOPOLITICS	18
Shifts in the Regional Balance of Oil Reserves	
The Middle East and the Gulf Dominate Future Oil Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region as a Percent of	
World Total	
OPEC versus Non-OPEC Production, Reserves and Refining Capacity	
OPEC Status by Country	
The Middle East and the Gulf Dominate Future Oil Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region in Billions of	
Barrels	
Comparative World Oil Reserves by Region	
Reserves By Region & Major Producer Country	
Reserve to Production Ratios By Region & Major Producer	
The Life of Oil Reserves is an Issue for Everyone	
Oil Reserves Are Technology as Well as Price Dependent: US Reserves in the Lower 48 as a Test Case	
GAS RESERVES AND GEOPOLITICS	
Shifts in the Regional Balance of Gas Reserves	
The Middle East and the Gulf Dominate Future Gas Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region as a Percent	
World Total	
The FSU and the Middle East Dominate Future Gas Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region in Trillions of	
Cubic Meters	
World Gas Reserves by Key Nation	
World Gas Reserve to Production Ratios by Key Nation	
Gas Reserves Are Also Technology as Well as Price Dependent: US Reserves in the Lower 48 as a Test (	
Cus reserves in the Lower results at the Dependent. Co reserves in the Lower results at 15th	
UNCERTAINTIES AFFECTING KEY SUPPLIERS AND EXPORTERS	36
KEY AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY	37
World's Growing Dependence on the Gulf and Middle East: Projected Total Global Oil EXPORTS by	
Source in 1995 and 2020	38
World's Growing Dependence on the Gulf and Middle East:	
Projected Total Global Oil IMPORTS by Source in 1995 and 2020	
Rising Asian Demand is Met by Rising Middle Eastern Production: Net Balance of Regional Imports and	
Exports: 1995-2015	


Large Amounts of Oil Production and Exports Are at Risk	41
in Key Exporting Countries: 1995-2015	41
Cumulative Risk: Estimated Total Demand for Exports from Countries with Sensitive or High Risk Oil	
Production Capacity Affects 50% of World Supply	42
The FSU, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq are the Three Most Critical Future Exporters	43
Today's "Rogues" Had Damn Well Better Be Tomorrow's Suppliers: 1995-2020	44
Pattern of Oil Exports Could Sharply if the FSU Does Not Meet Estimated Production Levels and China	
Cannot Exploit New Fields: Prices Rises Likely	45
Domestic energy Demand Can Radically Change the Energy Available For Export: Middle Eastern	
Domestic Energy Demand As a Test Case	46
IEA/OECD Estimate of Middle Eastern Domestic Energy Demand	47
Downstream Operations Can Also Have Major Geopolitical Impacts: Gulf Cooperation Council vs. World	l
Petrochemical Design Capacities: 1993	48

# Impact of Oil and Gas on Present and Future Global Energy Demand

# **Key Oil Issues**

- Oil and gas energy use rises by 75% in BTUs between 1997 and 2020.
- Industrialized world and US become steadily more dependent on imports, with economic growth and Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) acting as the major uncertainty.
- Demand from the industrialized world, however, no longer dominates growth.
  - Asian demand has leapt since early 1960s.
  - Asia will become the dominant consuming region by 2010.
  - Asia's Imports will increase accordingly.
  - China is actively competing in the "Great Game" for Central Asia oil and has outbid US firms in some areas.
- The Middle East and the Gulf are projected to dominate increases in oil supply.
- The growing domestic demand for oil in other developing regions will become a major factor and with steadily limit the export capabilities of the Middle East, Africa, and FSU.
- Pipeline, port, and tanker geopolitics will change fundamentally during 1998-2020.
- Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Russia represent "high risk" oil suppliers with major potential geopolitical impacts.

# Estimated Growth of Oil and Gas Use: 1970-2020 (Quadrillion BTU)




	1970	1990	1995	1996	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
■ Natural Gas	36.1	72	78.1	82.2	94.8	113.8	133.3	152.5	174.2
■ Oil	97.8	134.9	142.5	145.7	157.8	176.3	195.5	215.3	237.3

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, Internet, July 4, 1996, and International Energy Outlook, 1998, DOE/EIA-484(97), p. 8 and 135.

# Growing World and US Dependence on Imported Oil: 1990-2020

(Average Daily Domestic Production vs. Demand in Millions of Barrels Per Day)




	1990	1996	2000	2005	2010	2015
■ US Domestic Production	9.7	9.4	9.1	9	8.9	8.7
□ US Total Demand	17	18.3	19.6	21.3	22.7	23.7
■ Industrialized World Production	20.1	23	24.7	25.4	24.8	23.7
☐ Industrialized World Demand	39.5	43.4	45.6	48.4	51.1	53.3

Source: DOE/EIA, International Energy Outlook, 1998, p. 136 and 175.

# In the Past, the West Has Driven the Rise in Demand for Oil with Little Impact from Developing Asia: World Oil Consumption: 1960-1996


(in Millions of Barrels Per Day (MMBD)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from <u>EIA Annual Energy Review, 1998,</u> http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf.html

### Asia, However, has Become a Major Oil Consumer: Asian Oil Consumption: 1960-1996


(in Millions of Barrels Per Day (MMBD)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from <u>EIA Annual Energy Review, 1998, http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf.html</u>.

# Asia Will Drive Most of the Future Increase in Demand for Oil: Total World Oil Consumption by Region: 1990-2020

(Millions of Barrels per Day)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DOE/EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, 1996, Washington, DOE, EIA-0484(96), May, 1996, p. 92, and <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, 1998, April, 1998, DOE/EIA-484(97), Reference Case, p. 136.

33


29

38.4

30.1

# Comparative Growth in Demand for Oil by Region: 1990-2020

(Millions of Barrels per Day)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DOE/EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, <u>1996</u>, Washington, DOE, EIA-0484(96), May, 1996, p. 92, and <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, <u>1998</u>, April, 1998, DOE/EIA-484(97), Reference Case, p. 136.

19

22

21

23.7

24.8

25.6

28.5

27.6

18.3

21.3

13.8


20.4

Asia

■ North America

# Middle Eastern Trade with Asia Must Change Fundamentally and Recycling "Petro-Yen" Will Not Be Easy

(Trade Patterns in 1996 in \$US Current Millions)



Note: Arabia and the Gulf includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. Eastern Mediterreanean includes Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria. North Africa includes Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan. All Arab includes previous countries less Iran and Israel. Middle East and North Africa includes all countries listed above.


Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIU, Internet data base, December 16, 1997.

# **Key Gas Issues**

- Massive uncertainties exist regarding the size of reserves and major changes could occur in current estimates by 2020.
  - Iran is a key uncertainty.
- Changes in gas liquids technology could change the definition of economic reserves, the value of gas, and the entire market for gas.
- Pipeline geopolitics are even more important for gas than for oil.
- North America, Europe, and FSU will dominate gas use, but Asian demand will rise sharply.
  - The growth of gas use in the Pacific Rim states will be particularly high.
  - Tanker traffic will increase because of both oil and gas demand.
- Russia may create pipelines to service China, Korea, and Japan altering current estimates of dependence on oil.

# North America, the FSU, and Western Europe Will Stay the Largest Consumers, but Asia Will Drive Most of the Increase in Gas Demand

(Total World Gas Consumption by Region: 1990-2015, Trillion Cubic Feet, EIA Reference Case)




	1990	1995	1996	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
□ Africa	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.4
☐ Industrial Asia	2.6	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.1	4.3	4.6
■ Middle East	3.6	4.7	5.2	5.4	6	6.8	7.8	8.9
■ Latin America	2	2.6	2.9	3.1	5	7.2	9.8	13
■ Developing Asia	3	4.7	5.3	9.5	14.1	18.5	22.6	27.7
■ Western Europe	10.3	12.7	14.1	16.2	19.9	23.5	27.7	32.1
■ FSU/E. Europe	28.1	23.4	23.7	26.8	31	35.2	38.7	42.7
■ North America	22	25.4	26	28.5	31.5	34.4	36.9	39.4

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DOE/EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, <u>1996</u>, Washington, DOE, EIA-0484(96), May, 1996, p. 92, and <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, <u>1998</u>, April, 1998, DOE/EIA-484(97), Reference Case, p. 137.

# Comparative Growth in Demand for Gas by Region: 1990-2020

(Millions of Barrels per Day)




	1990	1995	1996	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
☐ Africa	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.4
■ Industrial Asia	2.6	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.1	4.3	4.6
■ Middle East	3.6	4.7	5.2	5.4	6	6.8	7.8	8.9
■ Latin America	3.9	5	5.6	5.8	8.8	12.4	16.6	21.8
■ Developing Asia	3	4.7	5.3	9.5	14.1	18.5	22.6	27.7
■ Western Europe	10.3	12.7	14.1	16.2	19.9	23.5	27.7	32.1
■ North America	22	25.4	14.1	16.2	19.9	23.5	27.7	32.1
☐ FSU/E. Europe	28.1	23.4	23.7	26.8	31	35.2	38.7	42.7

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DOE/EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook, 1996</u>, Washington, DOE, EIA-0484(96), May, 1996, p. 92, and <u>International Energy Outlook, 1997</u>, April, 1997, DOE/EIA-484(97), Reference Case, p. 119.

### Asia Will Make Major Increases in its Gas Imports: Asian Gas Consumption: 1990-2020

(Trillion Cubic Feet of Consumption, EIA Reference Case)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, International Energy Outlook, 1998, p. 137.


# Geopolitical Impact of Oil and Gas Reserves

# Oil Reserves and Geopolitics

- Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) is steadily change reserve estimates and help the US and Northern Europe maintain reserve ratios for much longer than previously expected.
- Asia is "oil poor" in reserves, and reserves are depleting faster than new discoveries.
  - China is having little success in finding new reserves.
  - Offshore oil reserves in South China Sea may be myth.
  - India has virtually no oil.
  - Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) unlikely to provide much help.
- Russia's ability to exploit its reserves is economically and technically uncertain. Siberia is a particular problem.
- Gulf has about two-thirds of world's known oil reserves. Algeria and Libya have major reserves, and Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia have some oil.
  - North African reserves exceed reserves of all Sub-Saharan states: Angola, Nigeria, etc.
  - Far Eastern reserves are comparatively low, with little potential for major new discoveries.
  - Other regions have a faster growth of domestic consumption as a ratio of reserves.
- Gulf and Middle Eastern oil reserves are just as important even if ultimate oil reserves are considered.
- New reserves in other regions tend to be offset by depletion of existing reserves.


# Shifts in the Regional Balance of Oil Reserves

(Billions of Barrels)




# The Middle East and the Gulf Dominate Future Oil Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region as a Percent of World Total

(Based on Oil and Gas Journal Forecast for and a World Total of 1,037.6 billion barrels)



# **OPEC versus Non-OPEC Production, Reserves and Refining Capacity**



Source: DOE/EIA, Non-OPEC Fact Sheet, 3/98.

### **OPEC Status by Country**

(Thousands of Barrels Per Day


Country	1997 Quota	1998 Quota	1998 Cutbacks*	<u>Crude Oil</u> <u>1997</u>	Production 3/98
Algeria	750	909	50,000	847	860
Indonesia	1,300	1,456	70,000	1,366	1,340
Iran	3,650	3,942	140,000	3,629	3,600
Iraq	1,200	1,314	0	1,182	1,820
Kuwait	2,000	2,190	125,000	2,038	2,210
Libya	1,390	1,522	80,000	1,446	1,450
Nigeria	1,865	2,042	125,000	2,217	2,270
Qatar	378	414	30,000	614	700
Saudi Arabia	8,000	8,761	525,000	8,562	8,460
UAE	2,161	2,366	125,000	2,236	2,400
Venezuela	2,359	2,583	325,000	3,275	3,370
TOTAL OPEC	25,033	27,500	-	27,457	28,480
Mexico	-	-	200,000	-	-
Norway	-	-	100,000	-	-
Oman	-	-	30,000	-	-
Yemen	-	-	20,000	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	1,945,000	-	-

<sup>\*</sup> Combined from the March 22, 1998, March 30 OPEC, and June 4 Amsterdam agreements.

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DOE/EIA <u>OPEC Fact Sheet</u>, June, 1998, and <u>Oil Production Agreements of 1998</u>, June 5, 1998.


The Middle East and the Gulf Dominate Future Oil Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region in Billions of Barrels

(Based on Oil and Gas Journal Forecast for and a World Total of 1,037.6 billion barrels)



### **Comparative World Oil Reserves by Region**

(Billions of Barrels)




	Gulf	Eurasia	OECD	Other OPEC	Other
☐ Identified Reserves	583	163.7	156.4	123.4	76.7
☐ Ultimate Resources - Low	834.2	383.5	450.2	250.4	175.7
Estimate					
☐ Ultimate Resources - High	992	636.6	605.7	317.1	255.6
Estimate					

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DOE/EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, 1997, April, 1997, DOE/EIA-484(97), Reference Case, p. 35.


# Reserves By Region & Major Producer Country

(Billions of Barrels in 1997)




### Reserve to Production Ratios By Region & Major Producer

(Reserves/Production Ratios in 1997)



### The Life of Oil Reserves is an Issue for Everyone


(Years of Proven Reserves at Average Rate of Production in 1996)



Note: Iran and Saudi Arabia probably have major additional reserves. Countries shown as 100 years have substantially larger reserve life, but it is impossible to determine how much. Source: British Petroleum and the Economist, August 2, 1997, p. 80.

### Oil Reserves Are Technology as Well as Price Dependent: US Reserves in the Lower 48 as a Test Case

(in Billions of Barrels)




Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, Annual Energy Outlook, 1998, p. 59.

# **Gas Reserves and Geopolitics**

- The Middle East plays a critical role in Gas Reserves, but the FSU has the largest reserves.
  - North American and Asian gas reserves are much higher as a ratio of current demand, but fall far short of FSU and Gulf.
  - Asia must become a major net gas importer from the Gulf, although the FSU will be a critical supplier.
- North African reserves again exceed Sub-Saharan reserves, but North African gas reserves are not high relative to world reserves or future demand.
- The FSU and Iran present a cumulative massive analytic problem because:
  - Data on oil reserves of Caspian states, Central Asia, and Iran are very uncertain.
  - Little meaningful data exist on the gas reserves of Russia, Caspian states, Central Asia, and Iran.
  - The economic value of given types of gas reserves is much more uncertain than for oil.
- The geopolitics of gas reserve are currently transportation limited!
  - New gas liquids technologies might change this.
  - Gas may substitute for oil in many exporting countries, increasing their oil export potential.


### Shifts in the Regional Balance of Gas Reserves

(Trillions of Cubic Meters)




# The Middle East and the Gulf Dominate Future Gas Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region as a Percent of World Total

(Based on Oil and Gas Journal Forecast for a World Total of 144.76 Trillion Cubic Meters)




The FSU and the Middle East Dominate Future Gas Supply: World Oil Reserves by Region in Trillions of Cubic Meters



### **World Gas Reserves by Key Nation**


(Trillions of Cubic Feet in Reserves)



Source: Oil and Gas Journal, and BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1998, p. 20.


.

# World Gas Reserve to Production Ratios by Key Nation (Nations with At Least 100 Trillion Cubic Feet in Reserves)



# Gas Reserves Are Also Technology as Well as Price Dependent: US Reserves in the Lower 48 as a Test Case

(in Trillions of Cubic Feet)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, Annual Energy Outlook, 1998, p. 59.


# **Uncertainties Affecting Key Suppliers and Exporters**

### **Key Areas of Uncertainty in Global Supply**

- Global and regional economic growth and energy demand.
- Russian stability and ability to produce.
- Chinese ability to find new oil and gas reserves and sustain production. Search for alternative sources of energy.
- Algerian stability.
- Sanctions Affecting Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
- Creation of new energy transportation infrastructure: Pipelines, ports, tankers, etc.
- The impact of domestic energy demand on export capacity, particularly in the Middle East.
- Possible impact on China on US coal exports.

## World's Growing Dependence on the Gulf and Middle East: Projected Total Global Oil *EXPORTS* by Source in 1995 and 2020


(MMBD, EIA Reference Case)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, <u>1998</u>, DOE/EIA-0484 (97), April 1997, p. 36.

### World's Growing Dependence on the Gulf and Middle East: Projected Total Global Oil *IMPORTS* by Source in 1995 and 2020


(MMBD, EIA Reference Case)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, <u>1998</u>, DOE/EIA-0484 (97), April 1997, p. 36.

#### Rising Asian Demand is Met by Rising Middle Eastern Production: Net Balance of Regional Imports and Exports: 1995-2015


(Millions of Barrels per Day, EIA Reference Case)



Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved.

# Large Amounts of Oil Production and Exports Are at Risk in Key Exporting Countries: 1995-2015

(EIA Reference Case Estimate in MMBD)




	73	75	80	85	90	96	0	5	10	15	20
■ Libya	2.175	1.48	1.787	1.059	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5
■ China	1.09	1.49	2.122	3	3	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5
□ Iraq	2.018	2.62	2.514	1.433	2.2	0.6	0.6	2.1	3.2	5.9	7.8
□ Iran	5.681	5.35	1.662	2.25	3.2	3.9	4	4.3	4.5	5.7	6.8
■ FSU	8.32	9.532	11.11	11.585	11	7.1	7.5	9.5	12.1	12.6	13.2
■ Saudi	7.596	7.075	9.9	3.388	8.6	10.6	10.9	11.2	13.5	17.2	23.8

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook, 1998</u>, DOE/EIA-0484 (97), April 1997, pp. 175, and EIA, <u>Monthly Energy Review</u>, April, 1997, pp. 130-131. Note that total world production is 69.7 MMBD in 1990, 73.0 MMBD in 1995, 81.4 MMBD in 2000, 90,5 MMBD in 2005, 98.1 MMBD in 2010, and 106.9 MMBD in 2015.

# Cumulative Risk: Estimated Total Demand for Exports from Countries with Sensitive or High Risk Oil Production Capacity Affects 50% of World Supply


(EIA Reference Case Estimate in MMBD)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, 1998, DOE/EIA-0484 (97), April 1997, pp. 175, and EIA, <u>Monthly Energy Review</u>, April, 1997, pp. 130-131. Note that total world production is 69.7 MMBD in 1990, 73.0 MMBD in 1995, 81.4 MMBD in 2000, 90,5 MMBD in 2005, 98.1 MMBD in 2010, and 106.9 MMBD in 2015.

The FSU, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq are the Three Most Critical Future Exporters


(EIA Reference Case Estimate in MMBD)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, 1998, DOE/EIA-0484 (97), April 1998, pp. 175, and EIA, <u>Monthly Energy Review</u>, April, 1997, pp. 130-131. Note that total world production is 69.7 MMBD in 1990, 73.0 MMBD in 1995, 81.4 MMBD in 2000, 90,5 MMBD in 2005, 98.1 MMBD in 2010, and 106.9 MMBD in 2015.

Today's "Rogues" Had Damn Well Better Be Tomorrow's Suppliers: 1995-2020


(EIA Reference Case Estimate in MMBD)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook</u>, 1998, DOE/EIA-0484 (97), April 1998, pp. 175, and EIA, <u>Monthly Energy Review</u>, April, 1997, pp. 130-131. Note that total world production is 69.7 MMBD in 1990, 73.0 MMBD in 1995, 81.4 MMBD in 2000, 90,5 MMBD in 2005, 98.1 MMBD in 2010, and 106.9 MMBD in 2015.

## Pattern of Oil Exports Could Sharply if the FSU Does Not Meet Estimated Production Levels and China Cannot Exploit New Fields: Prices Rises Likely

(Estimated Demand vs. Production Capacity in MMBD, EIA Reference Case)




	1990	1996	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
■ China-Production	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5
□ China-Demand	2.3	3.5	4.4	5.6	7	8.8	11.2
■ FSU-Demand	8.4	4.4	4.4	5.1	5.9	6.7	7.5
■ FSU Production	11.4	7.1	7.5	9.5	12.1	12.6	13.2

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from EIA, <u>International Energy Outlook, 1998</u>, pp. 136, 175. Note that total world production is 69.7 MMBD in 1990, 73.0 MMBD in 1995, 81.4 MMBD in 2000, 90.4 MMBD in 2005, 98.1 MMBD in 2010, and 106.9 MMBD in 2015.

# Domestic energy Demand Can Radically Change the Energy Available For Export: Middle Eastern Domestic Energy Demand As a Test Case

(IEA Estimate in MTOE)



CC = Capacity Constrained or maximum production ES = Energy Savings, or reduced energy use. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IEA, <u>World Energy Outlook</u>, 1996, pp. 153-158.

### IEA/OECD Estimate of Middle Eastern Domestic Energy Demand (IEA Estimate in MMBD)

**Basic Energy Demand Trends** 

Category	<u> 1971</u>	<u>1993</u>	2000	<u>2010</u>	
				Capacity Constraints	Energy Savings
Primary Energy					<del></del>
Consumption (MTOE)	55	289	-	577	508
Final Consumption	35	189	-	358	316
Solids	0	1	-	2	2
Oil	21	130	-	200	178
Gas	12	37	-	93	83
Electricity & Heat	2	21	-	62	54
Energy Intensity					
(TOE/\$1000)	-	0.7	-	0.8	0.7
Energy Per Capita (TOE)0.8	2.0	2.0	-	2.7	2.4
Fuel Shares in Primary Demand					
(%)	1	2	2	2	
Solids	1	2	2	2	-
Oil	70	64	56	50	_
Gas	29	34	39	46	-
Hydro & Other	1	1	2	2	-

Growth in Energy Primary Demand & Intensity: 1975-1993

	<u>GDP</u>	Primary Energy	<b>Energy Intensity</b>
Iran	0.4	5.9	5.4
Saudi Arabia	3.4	12.1	8.7
Other 11 Countries	1.0	7.0	5.9
Total Middle East	1.3	7.6	6.2


**Final Energy Consumption Growth Trends** 

	<u> 1993-2000</u>	<u>2000-2010</u>	<u> 1993-2010</u>
Capacity Constraints	3.5	4.0	3.8
Energy Savings	2.9	3.2	3.1

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IEA, World Energy Outlook, 1996, pp. 173-177.

### Downstream Operations Can Also Have Major Geopolitical Impacts: Gulf Cooperation Council vs. World Petrochemical Design Capacities: 1993

(Thousand Tons)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IEA, World Energy Outlook, 1996, pp. 179-181.